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NO PLACE TO STAND: THE SUPREME
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADDRESS THE MERITS
OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS' LINE-ITEM
VETO CHALLENGE IN RAINES v. BYRD*
James L Alexander*

INTRODUCTION

President William Jefferson Clinton signed the Line Item Veto
Act of 19961 ("Line Item Veto Act" or "Act") on April 9, 1996,
and the law entered into effect on January 1, 1997.2 The law
enables the President to sign a comprehensive bill, giving the bill
full effect, and then grants him the power to cancel3 specific
117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000; B.A. NorthwesternUniversity, 1993.
The author thanks Robert J. Alexander, Brooklyn Law School Class of 1964, and
Jocelyn and Mort Reznick for their meaningful advice and support.
' Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692
(Supp. 1997)).
2 See § 5, Pub. L. No. 104-130 (1997).
3 The word "cancel" is included in the final line-item veto law to describe
the extent of the Executive's authority and is defined to mean rescind or "prevent
...from having legal force or effect." See 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4) (Supp. 1997). An
earlier version of what became the Act used the terms "veto" and "repeal." See
H.R. 2, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). Assistant Attorney General Dellinger warned
members of the Senate that a law authorizing "the President to 'veto' targeted
tax benefits after they become law, thus resulting in their 'repeal"' would
inevitably raise constitutional questions. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at
49 (1995). Mr. Dellinger continued to say that "the use of the terms 'veto' and
'repeal' is constitutionally problematic" given that the Presentment Clause states
that a President may only perform his "veto" power before a piece of legislation
is enacted into law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. "[T]he word 'repeal'.. . suggests
that the President is being given authorization to change existing law on his own
[which] arguably would violate the plain textual provisions of the [Presentment
Clause] ... ." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 49 (1995). This constitutes only a
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spending provisions and tax benefit measures contained in the same
legislation within five days, provided that the cancellation "reduce[s] the Federal budget deficit," 4 does "not impair any essential
government functions"5 and does "not harm the national interest."6

minor language change that does not alter the intent of the law. See City of New York
v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.D.C.) (holding Line Item Veto Act of 1996
unconstitutional stating "'[w]hen I see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like
a duck and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck') (quoting Richard Cardinal
Cushing)), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1123 (1998) (oral argument set for April 27,
1998).
' See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(3)(A)(i).
5 See id. § 691(a)(3)(A)(ii).
6 See id. § 691(a)(3)(A)(iii). The overall purpose of the Act is to minimize
cases like the Fiscal Year 1994 Agriculture Appropriations Bill, in which
Congress added $221,000 for blueberry research at the University of Maine and
$140,000 for a swine study at the University of Minnesota. See 141 CONG. REC.
H 1103 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cunningham (R-Cal.)).
However, some scholars point to evidence culled from the 43 states that currently
allow for some form of line-item veto to show that the power has done little to
curb government's extravagant spending habits. See Clay Chandler, Line-Item
Veto May Alter The Way Bills Are Crafted, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1997, at Al
("'[alfter an extensive review of the experience states had with the veto in the
1980's .... [t]he line-item veto itself does nothing to the level of spending."'
(quoting Syracuse University professor of economics Douglas Holtz-Eakin)). It
continues to be common practice for the federal legislature to present the
President with yearly omnibus appropriations bills containing a myriad of
unrelated programs and initiatives, many of which have very little to do with the
stated purpose of the legislation. These member items are commonly known as
"pork." See James Q. Wilson, Democracy Needs Pork To Survive, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 14, 1997, at A12 (defining "pork" as "getting consent to a complex bill by
doing particular favors for political interests of members").
As enacted, the Act's authorization is scheduled to sunset on December 31,
2004. See § 5, Pub. L. No. 104-30 (1997). An interesting scenario is sure to
arise, should the federal budget "mov[e] into the black," in the next two years
as some White House officials suspect. See Alexis Simendinger, The Art of the
Line-Item Veto, NAT'L J., Oct. 18, 1997, at 2088. The federal budget deficit hit
a high of $290 billion in 1992, but is now steadily decreasing. See Robert Pear,
US. Judge Rules Line Item Veto Act Unconstitutional,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1998, at A23. If there is no longer a federal deficit to remedy, the Act's lineitem veto authority will no longer exist. Simendinger, supra, at 2088. This will
present a problem for those such as Senators Daniel R. Coats (R-Ind.) and John
McCain (R-Ariz.), who support the existence of pure Executive line-item veto
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The passage of the Act marked the conclusion of a long history of
discussion and debate among scholars and government officials.7

power to curb Congress' frivolous spending habits. Pear, supra, at A23.
' This history of debate was summarized by Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan:
The line-item veto is not a new idea. President Ulysses S. Grant first
proposed it in 1873. In 1876, Representative Charles James Faulkner
of West Virginia introduced an amendment to the Constitution to
provide for a line-item veto. Some 150 line-item veto bills have been
introduced in the interim, but Congress has never seen fit to adopt any
of them.
141 CONG. REC. S4444 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Moynihan
(D-N.Y.)). See also Ronald D. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw; The Constitutional
Line-Item Veto Act, TEXAS LAWYER, June 23, 1997, at 28 (stating that "[a]t the
time of the Constitutional Convention, the term 'line-item veto' did not exist
because it did not need to exist"). Professor Rotunda states that the federal
government's lack of complexity at the time of the Constitutional Convention
made the merging of unrelated bills and riders infrequent. Id. Congress began the
practice of attaching appropriation riders to bills during President Grant's term.
Id. Frustration with this legislative practice prompted the first line-item veto
proposal. Id.
The modem movement to grant the President line-item veto authority began
with President Reagan's 1984 State of the Union Address. He stated that "[the
line-item veto] works in 43 states. Let's put it to work in Washington for all the
people." Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, reprinted in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE

UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN: 1984, at 87, 89 (1984). Thereafter, the

movement became a hallmark of the Republican party's "anti-government
mantra," John Jacobs, The Line-item Veto: Incompetence Meets Hypocrisy,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 4, 1997, at B7, and a significant piece of the party's
1994 "Contract With America," Eric Pianin & Stephen Barr, U.S. Workers'Shift
In Pensions Vetoed; Union, New York City File Court Challenges,WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 1997, at Al. The seven states that do not allow their governor to
exercise some sort of line-item veto are Indiana, Maine, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont. DeWayne Wickham,
Line-Item Advocates Nothing But Whiners, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1998, at 13A.
Of these states, North Carolina is the only one that does not allow for even an
"all-or-nothing" executive veto. Robert Destro, Whom Do You Trust? Judicial
Independence, The Powerof the Purse& The Line Item Veto, 44 FED. LAW. 26,
28 (1997).
In addition to the line-item veto, many state constitutions further discourage
the practice of adding unrelated riders to bills ("log-rolling") by requiring the
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The line-item veto debate shifted quickly from the Houses of
Congress to the federal courts. 8 On January 2, 1997, the day after
the Act became effective, four Senators 9 and two members of the
House of Representatives' I joined together to challenge the Act's
constitutionality in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.' The District Court held in favor of these Legislators, concluding first that, as members of Congress, they

legislature to limit bills to a single subject. Id. At the most extreme, Wisconsin
requires that "no private or local bill which shall be passed by the legislature
shall embrace more than one subject

....

"

Id. at 28-29 (referencing Wis.

CONST. art. IV, § 18).
' The first federal court challenge to the line-item veto occurred in National
Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In
that case, a labor union challenged the constitutionality of the line-item veto
before it entered into law, but was denied standing to sue for lack of a concrete
injury. See id. at 1432. The organization argued unsuccessfully that the presence
of presidential line-item veto power would require their organization to lobby the
executive branch, in addition to their normal legislative advocacy activities,
creating new costs and burdens. Id. at 1430. The court based its holding of
inadequate standing upon both National Taxpayers' Union v. United States, 68
F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that hindering the furtherance of an
organization's objectives "is the type of abstract concern that does not impart
standing"), and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)
(differentiating a direct injury to an "organization's activities" from "a setback
to the organization's abstract social interests").
9 The Senators were Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Or.)
(retired at adjournment of the 104th Congress), Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).
10 The members were David E. Skaggs (D-Colo.) and Henry A. Waxman
(D-Cal.).
" See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C.), vacated, Raines v. Byrd,
117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997). The language of the Act's judicial review clause
provides that "[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected
by [this Act] may bring an action, in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the
ground that any provision of this part violates the Constitution." 2 U.S.C.
§ 692(a)(1) (Supp. 1997). The Act further provides for direct and expedited
appeal to the Supreme Court. 2 U.S.C. § 692(c). The Act states that "[iut shall
be the duty of ... the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on the
docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of [any suit
challenging the Act's constitutionality]." Id.
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possessed standing to sue 2 pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, 13 and second, that the Line Item Veto Act conflicted with the
Presentment Clause 4 of the Constitution." The defendants, 6
representing the Executive Branch, immediately appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court.' 7 On expedited appeal, the
Supreme Court held that the Legislators lacked standing to

12

Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 31. "In essence the question of standing is whether

the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The central focus
of the standing doctrine rests on the appropriateness of the plaintiff who asserts
a "personal" injury, rather than on the judicial cognizability of the issue itself.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
"3See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that "[t]hejudicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the
Laws of the United States... ; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;... to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party .... "); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 states:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
Id.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The Presentment Clause states:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it becomes Law, be presented to the President
of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall
return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall ... proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill,
it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds
of that House, it shall become a Law.
Id.
'5 See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 30-36.
16 The defendants were the parties charged with operationally carrying-out
the line-item veto: Frederick D. Raines, Director of Office of Management and
Budget, and Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury. Id. at 27.
7 See 2 U.S.C. § 692(c) (Supp. 1997) (legislatively providing for expedited
appeal directly to the Supreme Court).
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challenge the Act at the time of their suit, and vacated the District
Court's judgment with instructions to dismiss the complaint, thus
failing to address the merits of the constitutional claim. 8 As a
result, and as expected, President Clinton exercised the line-item
veto power for the first time on August 11, 1997 under a cloud of
constitutional controversy.'" More than one year after the Act's
challengers first initiated suit in the federal court system, the
fundamental constitutional questions swirling around the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996 remain unanswered.20
This Note argues that the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act
conferred significant law making powers upon the Executive
Branch to the direct detriment of each member of Congress'
constitutionally reserved legislative functions. The District Court for
the District of Columbia, therefore, correctly held that this transfer
of power resulted in a sufficient Article III injury to compel federal
court jurisdiction over the Byrd complaint, and the Supreme Court
wrongfully dismissed the action creating needless controversy. Part
I of this Note reviews the Supreme Court's working framework for
making standing determinations. Part II examines the stated purpose
of the judicial review clause included in the Line Item Veto Act of
1996 and its impact on the justiciability of the Legislators'
constitutional challenge. Part III posits that the District Court for
the District of Columbia correctly followed past legislative standing
cases to allow the Legislators to advance the merits of their
constitutional claim in Byrd. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's
18

See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2322-23 (1997).

'9 See John F. Harris, Clinton Wields New Authority, Vetoing 3 Items:
President Strikes Down Tax and Spending Provisions, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,
1997, at Al (quoting New York State Governor George E. Pataki's reaction to
President Clinton's cancellation of his state's Medicaid reimbursement formula,
where he characterized the veto as a "body blow" to New York's health care
system and promised that his administration would "fight in Congress and in the
courts" to reverse the veto); infra note 39 (referencing statements by members
of the House of Representatives urging swift judicial resolution of the constitutional questions raised by the Act).
20 President Clinton's Administration is currently appealing the recent D.C.
District Court decision that found the Act unconstitutional to the Supreme Court.
City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.D.C.), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 1123 (1998). This Note went to press prior to a disposition of this appeal.
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Raines v Byrd decision and criticizes the Court's rationale for
denying the Legislators standing to challenge the Act, and needlessly engendering the constitutional cloud that continues to swirl
around the line-item veto. Part V discusses the future of the Line
Item Veto Act in the federal court system and speculates that
despite its sound policy goals, the Act will soon be found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This Note concludes that the
diminution of Congress' legislative powers as a result of the Line
Item Veto Act should have qualified as a sufficient injury to
warrant federal court jurisdiction over the Legislators' constitutional
challenge.
I.

TRADITIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS

In several decisions delivered during the past fifty years, the
Supreme Court has constructed a framework for determining the
justiciability of a federal court complaint. 2' The most basic
requirement demands that the complaint present a "case" or
"controversy., 22 In order to demonstrate that a case or controversy
is worthy of federal court jurisdiction, a litigant must satisfy two
levels of review: "constitutional limitations on the federal court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise., 23 Article III
prescribes the constitutional framework for limitations on federal

2" Justiciability

will be used here as a general term encompassing standing,

ripeness, redressibility, adverse parties and mootess. See Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 94-99 (1968). Each quality is determinative in the Supreme Court's
overall jurisdictional analysis. See WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 84-123 (10th ed. 1997).
22 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471
(1982) (holding that the federal government's transfer of public property to a
religious organization in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause did not
"injure" the plaintiff, making their claim non-justiciable).
23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). See infra notes 51, 92 and
accompanying text (describing the differences between Article III standing
limitations under the Constitution, and judicially erected "prudential" standing
restrictions designed to discourage the courts from infringing upon legislative or
executive domain).
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court jurisdiction.24 The Supreme Court interprets this article to
mean:
At an irreducible minimum.. . the party who invokes the
court's authority . .. [must] show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant ... and that the
"injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and
"..."25
"is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision .
To be worthy of federal court jurisdiction, the alleged injury must
be "distinct and palpable, 2 6 "and not 'abstract' 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.' 27 Despite this comprehensive description, "[t]he
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts
concededly not susceptible of precise definition .
*..
,2 Consequently, the Court leaves itself substantial leeway when it comes to
making standing evaluations.29
Commentators reporting on the Supreme Court's handling of
Article III standing questions seem to fall into two ideological
camps.3 ° Some legal scholars, such as Alexander Bickel, favor a
narrow injury standard,3 ' which often discourages the courts from
reaching the merits of disputes.32 Others tend to favor more
"activist" courts and broader justiciability characterizations which

24

See U.S. CONST. art. III.

25

See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
26 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
27 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). See also O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (denying standing to plaintiffs who failed to
advance an adequate Article III case or controversy), vacated, Spomer v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974).
28 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
29 See infra notes 53, 61, 153-161 and accompanying text (describing some
of the Court's more liberal applications of the standing doctrine).
30 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegrationof Article III, 74
CAL. L. Rtv. 1915, 1916 (1986).
31 See generallyALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

(1962) (positing that narrow and restrictive justiciability principles are critical to
sound judicial review).
32 COHEN & VARAT, supra note 21, at 81.
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are more likely to lead courts to address the merits of controversies.33 With these divergent points of view in mind, the
Supreme Court admits that it does not uniformly or mechanically
apply constitutional standing requirements. 34 The Court's history
of indecision on standing questions has proven to be a liability to
lower court judges who lack a clear guide by which to base their
standing decisions.35 Congress' legislative judgments are also
affected by this inconsistency. By including broadly phrased
judicial review language in statutes such as the Line Item Veto Act,
Congress has sought to make standing determinations more
predictable.
II. STATUTORILY GRANTED STANDING RIGHTS

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 contains a judicial review
clause that prescribes the acceptable procedures for what Congress
characterized as inevitable challenges to the Act's constitutionality.3 6 During the mark-up of the bill that eventually became
the Act, Representative Nathan Deal (R-Ga.) proposed the inclusion
of this clause for the purpose of expediting judicial review. He
stated, "[iut should be obvious that until ... constitutionality is
clarified, [the Act] will be under a cloud."37 The clause is included in the final signed law.38 Thus, there can be no question that
both Congress and the President intended all of the constitutional
questions surrounding the Act to be answered rapidly by the courts
to mitigate any controversy prior to the President's exercise of the
veto power.39 Pursuant to this clause, any member of Congress or

33COHEN & VARAT, supra note 21, at 81.

34 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 89 (1984).
31 See Nichol, supra note 30, at 1916.
36 See supra note 11 (outlining the Act's prescribed judicial review
provisions).
37 See 141 CONG. REc. Hi 138 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Deal).
3' 2 U.S.C. § 692(a) (Supp. 1997).
3'The intent of Congress is unqualified:

662

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

any citizen adversely impacted by the Act 40 can claim a legally
enforceable and "concrete impairment of protected interests ' ' 1 in
the federal court system.42

As a supporter of the line-item veto, I believe that is it important that
any questions regarding the constitutionality of the line-item be
resolved as quickly as possible. As long as legal questions remain,...
any spending cut through the line-item veto process would certainly be
challenged. The effectiveness of the line-item veto will be severely
handicapped until the legal questions are resolved. It is in nobody's
interest to leave the status of line-item veto authority in limbo for an
extendedperiod of time .... Hopefully, the procedure established by
my amendment will result in a final resolution regarding the constitutionality of line-item veto authority before the Fiscal Year 1996
appropriations bills are sent to the President.. . . [I]f my amendment
for judicial review is not added to the bill, it is unlikely that the courts
would consider the issue until the President exercises the line-item
authority.
141 CONG. REC. HI 139 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Deal)
(emphasis added). The judicial review clause also received the support of
members opposing the Act:
[I] rise in support of the Deal amendment. It is one that we should all
be able to support whether we support the bill or oppose the line-item
veto bill . . . . Proponents of [the bill] should want to have the
constitutional question regarding this bill settled as soon as possible.
...This amendment says that the courts can go ahead and hear a test
case on this legislation constitutionally without having to wait for the
President to use the line-item veto authority this bill gives him.
Id. (statement of Rep. Collins (D-Ill.)). President Clinton has also acknowledged
and supported the purpose of the Act's judicial review clause. See Remarks by
PresidentClinton at Signing ofLine Item Veto Legislation,Federal News Service
(April 9, 1996) (stating that "We anticipate that [the Act] will be challenged-we've worked hard to provide for a means for [the Act's constitutionality] to be resolved quickly").
" 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1) (establishing the Act's broad grant of standing to
challenge its constitutionality).
"' Id. When accompanied "by a concrete impairment of protected interests,"
a claim may fall within the legitimate scope ofjudicial review. See Nichol, supra
note 30, at 1916.
42 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH L. REv. 163, 191 (1992) (stating that
"[w]hether an injury is cognizable should depend on what the legislature has said
...or on the definitions of injury provided in the various relevant sources of
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The effects of similar judicial review clauses included in the
Federal Election Campaign Act 43 ("FEC Act") and in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 44 were debated in Buckley
v Valeo 45 in 1976. Section 437(h) of the FEC Act provides that
three types of plaintiffs may "institute... actions... to construe
the constitutionality of any provision of this act. '46 These eligible
plaintiffs are the Federal Election Commission, the national
committee of any political party, and most notably, "any individual
47
eligible to vote in any election for the office of President.
During the Senate debate in consideration of the bill that became
the FEC Act, Senator James Buckley, in similar fashion to
Representative Deal during the Line Item Veto Act debate,
proposed to include this judicial review provision allowing standing
for constitutional challenges.48 In Buckley, the Supreme Court
showed little concern for whether Senator Buckley had standing as
an "individual eligible to vote" in a presidential election. 49 The
Court stated that the FEC Act "intended to provide judicial review
to the extent permitted by Article Ill. " ' 0 Although it would appear

positive law.").

2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (1982 & Supp. 1985); 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-607 (1982).
26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
4' 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
46 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (1982 & Supp.
1985).
43
44

47 id.

120 CONG. REC. S10,557-63 (1974) (statement of Sen. Buckley) ("I am
sure we will all agree that if, in fact, there is a serious question as to the
constitutionality of this legislation, it is in the interest of everyone to have the
question determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time."). See
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 283-84
(1988) (discussing examples of statutorily created standing rights).
41

49

See id. at 284.

" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 (1976). The Court stated:
At the outset we must determine whether the case before us presents
a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution. Congress may not, of course, require this court to render opinions
in matters which are not "cases or controversies." We must therefore
decide whether appellants have a "personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy" necessary to meet the requirements of Art. III. It is clear
that Congress, in enacting 2 U.S.C. § 437(h), intended to provide
judicial review to the extent permitted by Art. III. In our view, the
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from Buckley that Article III's standing limitations are satisfied
where Congress extends a specific statutory grant, prevailing
opinions are that such a grant will only satisfy the "prudential"
component of standing analyses." As detailed in Raines v Byrd,

complaint in this case demonstrates that at least some of the appellants
have a sufficient "personal stake" in a determination of the constitutional validity of each of the challenged provisions to present a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific reliefthrough a decree
of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Id. at 11-12. Although the Court stated that "at least some" of the plaintiffs had
standing, they subsequently answered the certified question of whether "each"
plaintiff has standing by stating: "[h]as each of the plaintiffs alleged sufficient
injury to his constitutional rights enumerated in the following questions to create
a constitutional 'case or controversy' within the judicial power under Article III?
YES." Id. at 12 n. 11 (emphasis added). See Fletcher, supranote 48, at 284 n.292
(opining that the Buckley Court showed little concern for Mr. Buckley's standing
as a Senator). In a later case involving the same standing issues, the Court held
that while plaintiffs did not qualify as one of the three defined classes of eligible
plaintiffs, their group could have been included if Congress had so intended.
Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n., 455 U.S. 577, 584
(1982) (holding trade associations and political action committees ineligible to
challenge the Federal Election Campaign Act, but stating that standing could be
conferred upon parties granted authorization statutorily by Congress). See also
Fletcher, supra note 48, at 284 ("Of course, had Congress intended [to grant
plaintiffs the right to bring suit under section 437(h)] it could easily have
achieved [this result] ....Instead, Congress gave no affirmative indication that
it meant to include in its grant any parties beyond [those listed in section
437(h)].").
"1See Fletcher, supra note 48, at 285; infra note 92 (discussing the
elimination of prudential standing concerns). The Court has stated that standing
may be accepted or denied based upon "prudential" considerations, which are
independent of traditional constitutional restrictions. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). However, where Congress explicitly grants standing
to a class of plaintiffs by statute, the Court's "prudential" concerns are satisfied.
Fletcher, supra note 48, at 252. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2318 n.3.
(1997) (accepting statutory grant of standing to satisfy the prudential restriction,
but still requiring plaintiffs to suffer a "distinct and palpable injury," pursuant to
Article III's standing threshold); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (stating "Congress may
grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by
prudential standing rules .... [However] Article III's requirement remains").
"When the Court refuses to find prudential standing, it, in effect, refuses to infer
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the Court remains very much concerned with rigidly applying
Article III's standing limitations.5 2
In the past, the government has been more amenable to a broad
system of judicial review including legislatively created standing
rights embedded in statutes.5 3 This principle is evidenced by a
a cause of action from existing legal materials." Fletcher, supra note 48, at 252.
52

Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 n.3 (stating that a statutory grant of standing

does not satisfy constitutional standing limitations set forth in Article III). In
addition to the "bedrock requirement" that a plaintiff present a "case" or
"controversy" as stated in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1986), the Raines
Court characterized Article III's standing limitations as requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate a "personal stake" in the dispute, and to show that the injury is
"particularized as to him." Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2317. However, in an earlier
opinion, the Warren Court took a less definite position on the meaning of Article
III and its standing restrictions. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) ("The
many subtle pressures which cause policy considerations to blend into the
constitutional limitations of Article III make the justiciability doctrine one of
uncertain and shifting contours.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
" One author has noted:
Actually, the Court has little room, at least under existing constitutional
law, to overturn any congressional grant of standing. Given the
confused state of article III jurisprudence, if Congress chooses to
implement federal policies through the employment of the judiciary in
actual lawsuits the Supreme Court would be hard pressed to deny that
such efforts are necessary and proper exercises of Congressional
authority.
Nichol, supra note 34, at 84. See also infra notes 61, 153-161 and accompanying
text (addressing the Court's proclivity for accepting standing pursuant to factors
that appear to be more abstract than those raised in Raines).
In several cases, the Court has accepted some standing arguments where
interests did not appear to be "distinct and palpable." For example, The
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") provides that "any person" can file a challenge
to enforce the statute. 16 U.S.C. § 1640(g) (1982). While an ordinary citizen's
subjective concern over the possible extinction of an animal would seem to be
intangible and generalized, the Court did not address the standing issue in
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), which involved a
challenge to the ESA. Nichol, supra note 34, at 84 n.94. The Court has also
allowed standing to be based upon rights and "benefits of living in an integrated
community." See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1982)
(granting standing to residents under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, despite
acknowledging that "neighborhood standing" may involve an indirect injury);
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proposed provision of the Virginia Plan, championed by James
Madison at the Constitutional Convention, which detailed the
creation of a "Revisionary Council" composed of the President and
several members of the Supreme Court. 4 This Council would act
as a check upon legislative action by reviewing legislation approved
by Congress. 5 If this Council rejected a measure, it could become
law only after a legislative override. 6 Although the framers
ultimately rejected the creation of the Council," some scholars
have concluded that the existence of this proposal shows "that the
founders must have welcomed any traditional mechanism that could
aid in keeping Congress within bounds."58 Thus, there is some
historical evidence of a broadly characterized system of judicial
review.
Various Supreme Court decisions have suggested that Congress
can create legally enforceable interests even where none existed
before. 9 In some cases, the Court has held that congressional
power to create standing rights was limited by the requirements of

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (granting
standing to tenants of a housing complex to challenge the alleged racially
discriminatory practices of their landlord that deprived them of "the social
benefits of living in an integrated community ...[and caused them to] suffe[r]
...economic damage").
14 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911).
" Nichol, supra note 34, at 84.
56 See Nichol, supra note 34, at 93.
17 See Nichol, supra note 34, at 93.
" Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 834 (1969).
" Id. at 816. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 n.15
(1978) (accepting the general clause in the Endangered Species Act, granting
standing to "any person" to enforce its provisions); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 514 (1975) (stating that "Congress may create a statutory right or
entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even
where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the
absence of statute") (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973); Nichol, supra note 34, at 84 n.94 (reasoning that the Court has allowed
interests which are not "distinct and palpable" to serve as acceptable bases for
standing).
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Article 111.60 However, in various other cases, the Court has
shown a willingness to confer jurisdiction based solely upon
abstract and shared statutorily created injuries.6 1 These intersecting
ideas have been addressed aggressively by Justice Antonin
Scalia. 62 In his majority opinion in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,63 Justice Scalia concluded that "legislatively pronounced"
"public rights" cannot supply a basis for federal court standing
unless they correspond with the Court's narrow interpretations of
concrete and tangible injuries.' Several scholars regard Lujan as
60

See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 518 (denying petitioners standing to

challenge adjacent town's zoning ordinance that excluded low and moderate
income persons from living in the town); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 617 (1973) (denying standing to birth-mother seeking child support from
child's father because statute required parents to be married); Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141,
1147 (1993).
6 See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10
(1972) (allowing standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 based upon harm
to plaintiffs' interest in interracial association); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363, 375 (1982) (granting standing to plaintiff "testers," posing as
prospective home-buyers, to challenge an apartment complex owner's alleged
racially-discriminatory steering practices under the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
In Havens Realty, the Court stated that "congressional intention cannot be
overlooked in determining whether testers have standing to sue." Id. at 373. See
also infra notes 153-161 and accompanying text (reviewing additional examples
of the Court's willingness to accept broadly-based standing assertions).
62 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of
Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983) ("[Standing law
should] restric[t] courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting...
minorities against impositions of the majority, and exclude them from the even
more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should
function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself."). Scalia reasoned
that the "core" requirement of particularized harm should impose a strict
limitation "upon the congressional power to confer standing." Id. at 883-84
(citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)). See Nichol, supra note
60, at 1147 (exploring Scalia's opposition to the "liberaliz[ation]" of modem
standing law).
63 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
6 Id. at 578. Scalia stated that there is "absolutely no basis for making the
Article III injury turn on the source of the asserted right." Id. at 576. If the
courts chose to ignore the concrete injury requirement because of the invitation
of Congress, they would violate "the separate and distinct constitutional role of
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marking a "transformation" in the law of standing from a more
broad-minded characterization of Article III to a much narrower
one.6" Because of this strict adherence to an ambiguous "personal"
injury requirement,66 the Court vacated the District Court's
decision in Byrd v. Raines.67 As a result, the Court failed to
expeditiously address the merits of the Line Item Veto Act's
constitutional controversy, and effectively rendered the motivation
behind the Act's judicial review clause null and void.
III. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT AND BYRD V. RAINES

In Byrd v. Raines, 68 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the Legislators possessed a sufficient
stake in their dispute to warrant federal court jurisdiction over their
challenge to the Line Item Veto Act.69 This decision followed a
series of holdings by the D.C. Circuit which demonstrate a
recognition of legislators' standing to challenge measures that
weaken their ability to exercise identifiable constitutional lawmaking functions.70

the Third Branch - one of the essential elements that identifies those 'Cases'
and 'Controversies' that are the business, of the courts rather than the political
branches." Id.
65 Professor Nichol argues that Justice Scalia has "ignored the scholarship
of the history of Article III ... [by] cavalierly stat[ig] that the injury
requirement is an 'irreducible constitutional minimum,' a 'principle fundamental,' and a 'common understanding' undergirding the exercise ofjudicial power."
Nichol, supra note 60, at 1152-53 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576).
66 See infra notes 134-139, 142-148 and accompanying text (arguing that the
characteristics of an "official capacity" injury does not make the injury
necessarily impersonal).
67 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C.), vacated, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312
(1997).
68 Id.
69

Id. at 31.

70

Id. at 30. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974)

(holding that depriving a congressional plaintiff of the constitutional process by
which a bill becomes a law is a sufficiently specific injury to warrant federal
court jurisdiction). The Kennedy Court granted standing to Senator Edward
Kennedy and his colleagues to argue that a bill could become law without the
President's signature 10 days after it was presented. Id. at 436. The court stated:
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The Legislators asserted that the Line Item Veto Act dilutes
voting powers conferred by Article I of the Constitution.7' Prior
to January 1997, members of Congress could be assured that after
voting upon an aggregated appropriations bill, the President would
either sign and accept the comprehensive bill or veto it in whole.

It seems to this court axiomatic that, to the extent that Congress' role
in the government is thus diminished, so too must be the individual
roles of each of its members. Put another way, the influence of any
one legislator upon the political process is in great measure dependent
upon the stature of the governmental branch of which he is a member.
Id. Moore v. US. House of Representatives is another example of the D.C.
Circuit's willingness to confer jurisdiction in legislator standing cases. 733 F.2d
946, 950-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1106 (1985). In Moore, the
D.C. Circuit granted standing to challenge a violation of the constitutional
requirement that revenue raising bills originate in the House, despite the
concurrence of then Circuit Judge Scalia who argued strongly against the
affirnmative standing determination. The majority stated that:
[Where] the injury claimed... is to the members' rights to participate
and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution...
[the] [d]eprivation of a constitutionally mandated process of enacting
law may inflict a more specific injury on a member of Congress than
... a generalized complaint that a legislator's effectiveness is
diminished by allegedly illegal activities taking place outside the
legislative, forum.
Id. at 951. The court also asserted that "the mere fact that a case involves an
unlawful deprivation of a legislator's powers by members of a coordinate branch
of government does not automatically deprive the federal courts of power to
adjudicate the claim." Id. at 953. See also Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 625
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (granting members of Congress standing to challenge House
Rule allowing territorial delegates to vote because of its vote-diluting effect);
Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1168-71 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding standing
to challenge House leadership committee's seating assignments), cert.denied,464
U.S. 823 (1983).
In addition to the D.C. Circuit, other federal circuits have ruled in a similar
fashion in legislator standing cases. See Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 55052 (7th Cir.) (granting Wisconsin state legislators standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Governor's "partial veto" power), cert denied, 502 U.S.
860 (1991).
"' Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, supra note 14
(setting forth the text of the Presentment Clause prescribing the procedures for
presenting a bill for Executive approval or objection).
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The only way such a bill could be changed would be as a result of
new House and Senate votes. 72 The Act's passage fundamentally
altered these time-tested procedures. 73 As a result of the Act,
members of Congress lack absolute certainty that the projects and
initiatives they work hard to build consensus around will be
ultimately implemented. 74 A Senator's vote for an "A-B-C" bill
"might lead to the post hoc creation of an 'A-B' law, an 'A-C' law,
or a 'B-C' law, depending on the President's use of his newly
conferred authority., 75 The foundation of the Legislators' case
rested upon their contention that their votes in Congress carry a
wholly different meaning than prior to the Act's passage.76
The District Court accepted the argument that since the
enactment of the Line Item Veto Act, members of Congress were
"'injured' in a constitutional sense whenever an appropriations bill
comes up for a vote, whatever the President ultimately does with
it."'77 The District Court rejected the argument which was later

72

See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 31.

71See Editorial, Striking Down the Line Item Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,

1998, at A12 (stating that "[t]he line item veto not only allows the President to
edit the law, it allows him to undo the entire legislative process").
74See Kenneth Jost, Line-Item Case May Hinge On Standing, LEGAL TIMES,
May 19, 1997, at 2 (stating that "the new law 'is a nullification of a senator's or
representative's vote... . "' (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional law
professor at the University of Southern California Law Center)).
75 Brief for Appellees at *25, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997) (No.
96-1671) (quoting Appellee Sen. Byrd), available in 1997 WL 251423.
76 Plaintiffs argued:
A Member, who in voting "yea" on a bill, is unconstitutionally forced
to give the President the option of vetoing an item without which the
Members vote would have been "nay" is suffering an injury well
within the holdings of those [previous Supreme Court] cases even if it
is not certain that the President will veto the item.
Id. at 26. Furthermore, as evidenced by the President's first use of the line-item
veto, a victim of a specific veto may not be given advance warning that their
item will be "canceled." See Harris, supra note 19, at Al (stating that House
Speaker Newt Gingrich felt "blindsided" by the President's use of the veto since
the canceled items had survived "protracted bipartisan negotiations").
77 Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 31. "The advent of the line-item veto has shaken the
200-year old power relationships in the federal government. While presidents
have always paid close attention to their own priorities, the veto has given them
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adopted by the Supreme Court,7 8 that the Legislators' suit lacked
ripeness as required by the "case or controversy" requirement
prescribed by Article III. 79 Instead, the District Court astutely
accepted the plaintiffs' assertion of ongoing harm and injury,
resulting from a new and fundamentally altered relationship with
the Executive Branch. 80 D.C. District Court Judge Jackson
compared this ongoing harm with the ongoing harm found in
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 81 where a review board comprised of members of Congress, possessed a yet-to-be exercised
veto power over the Airport Authority's Board of Directors.82 In
Metropolitan, the Supreme Court granted standing stating that
"[t]he threat of the veto hangs over the Board of Directors like a
sword over Damocles, creating a 'here-and-now subservience' to
the Board of Review sufficient to raise constitutional questions."83
Relying on this language, Judge Jackson also granted standing
holding that the ripeness requirement was satisfied because of the

an unprecedented ability to micromanage the appropriations process." Guy
Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Line-Item Veto Tips TraditionalBalance of Power;
CapitolHill Plots Strategy to Counter the President'sPen, WASH. POST, Oct. 24
1997, at Al. See Simendinger, supra note 6, at 2088 (quoting President Clinton
as saying the line-item veto "will lead to different kind of negotiation in the
budgeting process").
" Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 30. See Raines v. Byrd, 117. S. Ct. 2312, 2322
(1997).
" See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
81 (1978) (holding issue ripe for adjudication because "appellees will sustain
immediate injury" from the use of power plants); supra notes 23, 49 and
accompanying text (describing Article III's standing threshold).
" See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 32. One Senator commented that the Line Item
Veto Act "will change the spending habits of Congress . .. . [B]ecause the
President has the line-item veto, it will change the way we put the bills together
in the first place." 141 CONG. REC. S4140 (daily ed. March 17, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Coats (R - Ind.). See also id. at S4221 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) ("The
line-item veto power will fundamentally change the way we think and behave [as
legislators].").
g' 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
82 Id. at 260.
83 Id. at 265 n.13.
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similar subservient relationship created by the Line Item Veto
Act. 84
Given its geographic location, the D.C. Circuit possesses an
inordinate amount ofjurisprudence on public officials and their use
of the federal court system to adjudicate constitutional matters.85
By way of contrast, most Supreme Court jurisprudence on Article
III standing issues is in response to privately initiated actions.86
Despite the D.C. Circuit's wealth of case law on the subject, the
Supreme Court has never endorsed the Circuit's legislator standing
analyses, and has consistently denied certiorari to most of its cases
where standing was questioned. 87 However, in the line-item veto
scenario, the Supreme Court was compelled to grant certiorari to
the defendants and to reconsider the District Court's decision on the
standing issue because of the language contained in the Act's
judicial review clause.

84 Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 32.

85 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

3531.11 (2d ed. 1984).
86 See infra note 142 (describing the Court's leading taxpayer standing
decisions). SeveralD.C. Circuit standing cases addressing legislator standing have
either been denied certiorari or resolved by the Supreme Court without
addressing the standing question. See supra note 70 (detailing examples of
acceptable legislator standing in D.C. Circuit cases); Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 31
(stating that "the Supreme Court has never endorsed the [D.C.] Circuit's analysis
of standing in such cases. . ."); Jost, supra note 74, at 3 (reviewing the D.C.
Circuit's legislator standing decisions that have been denied certiorari by the
Supreme Court). Recently, Justice Scalia issued a strong majority opinion in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which some scholars have
regarded as one of the most important standing cases since World War II because
of its deliberate blow to citizen standing. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 164-65.
87 A reason for differing justiciability standards among the D.C. Circuit and
the Supreme Court is suggested by Professor Nichol. He argues that the Supreme
Court has applied the injury standard inconsistently, leaving the lower courts
deprived of guidance. See Nichol, supra note 30, at 1918 ("[T]rial judges have
been left completely at sea in the examination of which sorts of interests, if
abrogated, sustain jurisdiction.").
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IV THE SUPREME COURT AND RAINES v. BYRD

The Supreme Court imposes limitations on federal court
standing which are both constitutional, pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution,"8 and prudential, based upon the Court's preference to
preserve a separation of powers among the three branches of
government.8 9 Generally, the Court is reluctant to usurp the
powers of the other branches "unless obliged to do so in the proper
performance of [their] judicial function, when the question is raised
by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it."9' As acknowledged by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion of Raines
v. Byrd,9" the Court's prudential concerns are satisfied where
Congress expressly grants plaintiffs standing authorization. 92

88

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution states:

The judicial Power [of the federal courts] shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State
and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States.
Id.
89

See supra note 51 and accompanying text (outlining the parameters of

prudential standing). Prudential concerns are not prescribed by the Constitution,
rather they are judicially erected limitations designed to discourage the courts
from infringing upon legislative or executive domain. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
90 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (citing Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)).
91 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997).
92 Id. at 2318 n.3 ("[C]ongress' decision to grant a particular plaintiff the
right to challenge the act's constitutionality (as here, see § 692(a)(1) .. )
eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk
of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch when that plaintiff brings
suit."). See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1162-63 (1997) (holding that the
inclusion of a citizen suit provision in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g) (1973), allowing "any person" to file a challenge, expands Article III's
standing limitations to the "full[est] extent permitted"); supra note 51 (containing

674

JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY

The defendants did not contest prudential standing in their arguments,93 and the brevity of this discussion benefitted their case. If
the Court entered into a separation of powers discussion, it would
have been compelled to weigh the plaintiffs' substantial separation
of powers arguments, which go directly to the merits of their
constitutional challenge to the Act.94
The Court further imposes limitations on federal court jurisdiction when controversies implicate the "political question doctrine. ' '95 However, this limitation is similarly not grounded in
additional information on the Court's prudential standing concerns).
9'See Oral Argument of Appellants at * 12, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312
(1997) (No. 96-1671), availablein 1997 WL 276080 ("[W]e concede and concur
that the prudential standing of objections have been set to one side by the act of
Congress . . ").
9'Plaintiffs based their claim of injury upon a profound diminishment of
powers granted to the legislative branch by the Presentment Clause contained in
Article I of the Constitution. Brief for Appellees at *19, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.
Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), available in 1997 WL 251423. They maintain
that the Constitution textually grants "the power of the purse" to the legislature,
and the advent of the line-item veto tilts this power relationship in the favor of
the Executive, without amending the Constitution. Id. at *45. If the defendants
engagedthe Court in a separation of powers discussion on the justiciability of the
case, it is likely that the Plaintiffs' contention of damage to the legislature's
power relationship with the Executive would have been granted additional weight
by the Court in its justiciability evaluation. Instead, the plaintiffs' claim of
diminished legislative power was held to be insufficient grounds for Constitutional standing. Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2322.
9'"By extending the judicial power to all cases in law and equity, the
Constitution had never been understood to confer on that department any political
power whatever."ADDRESSES BY JOHN MARSHALL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1794 (ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD LIVINGSTON)
13 (1848). But see Charles Edward Umbanhower, Marshallon Judging, 7 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 210, 224 (1963) ("Marshall knew that the Court handled political
issues; anyone who would deny this is foolish .... The Court can and must
handle questions of public policy, political questions; but it cannot handle the
question in the way of politics, but in the way of law."). It remains clear
however, that the Court may refuse judicial review if "the constitution has
committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than
the courts." Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1959). In Raines v. Byrd, the Court found that the
Act's statutory grant of standing satisfied prudential separation of powers and
political question limitations. 117 S.Ct. at 2318 n.3. See also Linda Sandstrom
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constitutional construction, but is based solely upon judicial
defenses to preserve the separation of powers." Since both
Congress and the President expressly endorsed the Line Item Veto
Act and its judicial review clause,9 7 the Raines Court became
sufficiently convinced of each branch's comfort with using the
judicial forum to mollify its traditional separation of powers
concerns, and avoid the infusion of a "political question" analysis.9 8 With each of these non-constitutional barriers to standing
eliminated, the Raines Court's justiciability analysis was shortened
to only an Article III determination of whether the averred injury
was "personal, particularized, concrete and otherwise judicially
cognizable." 99
The Raines Court found the Legislators' claim to be nonjusticiable for two central reasons: 1) the Legislators lacked an
adequate "personal stake" in their dispute to satisfy the Court's
interpretation of the Article III injury standard; ° and 2) the lack
of such an injury prevented the Legislators from advancing a "ripe"
claim for relief. ° With prudential concerns eliminated by the
existence of the Act's explicit judicial review clause, it is unclear
how the Court can fault the ripeness of the Legislators' claim. In
Bowsher v Synar,'0 2 the Supreme Court addressed removal
Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine?, 100
DICK. L. REV. 303, 306 (1996) (arguing that the political question doctrine
"should be abolished" because it "retains little or no functional purpose" given
the existence of the Court's bedrock separation of powers concerns).
96 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term Forward: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961); Simard, supra note 95, at 333
(discussing the Court's non-constitutionally erected jurisdictional limitations
which promote separation of powers principles).
97 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. 1997) (the Line Item Veto Act); 2 U.S.C.
§ 692 (Supp. 1997) (the judicial review clause).
" See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318.
99 Id. "[C]ongress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have
standing." Id. at 2318 n.3.
00 Id. at 2322 ("In sum, appellees have alleged no injury to themselves as
individuals ... and their attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this
form is contrary to historical experience.").
101 Id.
102

478 U.S. 714, 727-28 (1986).
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provisions contained in the statute defining the Office of the
Comptroller General.' °3 There, the Court held that removal
provisions were "ripe" and worthy of full effect and consideration
despite their lack of prior use." By stating that the line-item
veto's constitutionality could be questioned in the federal courts at
another time,'0 5 the Raines Court points to a ripeness problem
that did not setback the appellees in Bowsher.
A. A Ripe Claim for Relief
Plaintiffs claimed to be worthy of federal court standing
because the Act infringes upon constitutionally reserved legislative
functions and profoundly alters the nature of the legislature's timetested relationship with the Executive Branch during appropriations
negotiations. 0 6 The defendants contended that the President's
intentions regarding the powers conferred by the Act were "entirely
speculative" and thus' insufficient to cause a justiciable Article III
injury 107 This, however is not at all true. President Clinton spoke
openly about his intention to exercise the line-item veto power as
soon as he possibly could.'0 8
103
104

See 31 U.S.C. § 703 (1983).
See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 728 n.5. The Court found that these removal

provisions could "hardly be thought to be undermined because of nonuse." Id.
" See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2322 (1997) (suggesting that the constitutionality of the Act could be challenged "by someone who suffers a judicially
cognizable injury . . .").
106 The mere existence of the Act forces "a Member who is not permitted to
vote 'yea' or 'nay' . . . on a menu of items from which the President may
choose ... [to] surrender an important power at the moment of voting, and...
[to] transfer to the President a choice that the Member is constitutionally entitled
to exercise himself." Brief for Appellees at *25-26, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct.
2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), available in 1997 WL 251423.
107 See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C.), vacated, Raines v.
Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
0s See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S8202-03 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (containing
letter from President Clinton to the Speaker of the House: "Dear Mr. Speaker:
I am writing to urge that Congress quickly complete work on the line-item veto
legislation so I can use it this year to curb wasteful tax and spending provisions"). In a press conference following the D.C. District Court's Byrd v. Raines
decision, the White House confirmed that the President "fully intended to use"
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Several Supreme Court decisions have found that Article III
injury need not occur to qualify for standing as long as an injury
is "certainly impending."'' 9 While the Court does place limits
upon acceptable "imminent" or "certainly impending" injuries,"'
these expressed restrictions fail to cover the immediacy of the harm

his line-item veto power imminently. See White House Press Release, at * 1 (Apr.
11, 1997), available in 1997 WL 174185; Juliet Eilperin & Jim Vande Hei, If
Line-Item Veto Debuts This Week, Battle Over Clinton "Cancellations"Will Be
Long, ROLL CALL (Wash. D.C.), Aug. 11, 1997 at * 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, ALLNWS File (quoting Stan Collender, managing director of BursonMarstellar's federal budget consulting group, as saying "[C]linton is showing his
willingness to use it. It gives his threats during (appropriations debates) more
credibility").
109 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (stating that "[a]
threatened injury must be 'certainly impending' to constitute injury in fact"). See
also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1983) (holding that issue of whether waste
disposal regulations were preempted by federal statute was ripe because
"requir[ing] the industry to proceed without knowing whether the moratorium is
valid would impose a palpable ...hardship. .. "); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 241 (1982) (noting threatened imposition of a state registration and
reporting requirement on religious organizations "surely amounts to a distinct and
palpable injury"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976) (holding challenge
to the Federal Election Campaigns Act was ripe anticipating "impending future
rulings and determinations"); Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
143-45 (1974) (holding that a time delay before disputed provisions of the Rail
Act come into effect does not impact justiciability); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (stating that petitioner could challenge a statute that "deters
the exercise of constitutional rights" without "expos[ing] himself to actual arrest
or prosecution"); Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506-08
(1972) (holding that the Michigan Water Pollution Act could be challengedbased
upon a threat of future enforcement); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
152 (1967) (stating that petitioner drug companies' day-to-day business
operations were sufficiently impacted by regulations to constitute a justiciable
controversy); Nichol, supra note 30, at 1950 n.89 (referencing "decisions
allowing preenforcement review of governmental action under a ripeness
analysis, based upon the present burdens of pending acts").
"0 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (stating
that "[a]lthough 'imminence' is concededly a somewhat elastic topic, it cannot
be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not
too speculative for Article III purposes - that the injury is 'certainly impending').
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befalling the complaining legislators in Raines."' Even at the
time these legislators filed their constitutional challenge in
Byrd,"2 the President's intention to use his line-item veto authority quickly and decisively was unquestionable.1 3 Based upon its

...
Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997). On August 11, 1997, in his first
use of his newly conferred line-item veto powers, President Clinton vetoed an
appropriation item for the State of New York's Medicaidreimbursement formula.
See Harris, supra note 19, at Al. As the senior Senator from the State of New
York at the time of this veto, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan experienced a
bonafide "injury" as a result of the President's use of his pen. Harris, supra note
19, at Al. While the substance of this veto was indeterminable when Senator
Moynihan and his colleagues raised their constitutional challenge, the circumstances at the time strongly evinced that such an impending harm could "proceed
with a high degree of immediacy, [and thereby] . . . reduce the possibility of
deciding a case in which no injury would ... occur[r] at all." Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 564 n.2. In Lujan, the Court explained that "[w]here there is no actual harm,
...its imminence (though not itspreciseextent) must be established." Id. at 564
(emphasis supplied). The Lujan Court rejected plaintiffs' claim that their injury
(being denied the opportunity to observe endangered animals) was "certainly
impending" because of an "indefinite" probability that the injury would occur.
See id. at 564 n.2. The Lujan Court also expressed that the availability of federal
court jurisdiction pursuant to an impending injury is "stretched beyond the
breaking point when ... the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least
partly within the plaintiffs own control." Id. Plaintiffs' generalized intent to
"some day" visit places where they may be denied the opportunity to observe
endangered animals, "is not simply enough" to support an "actual or imminent"
injury. Id. at 564. See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105
(1983) (opining that plaintiff, who had previously been choked by a police
officer, failed to establish a "case or controversy" where no "real or immediate
threat that he would again be... choke[d]" existed).
112 The Byrd defendants filed their challenge to the Line Item Veto Act on
January 2, 1997, the day after the Act entered into law. Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 27.
13 See supra note 108 (referencing the President's eagerness
to use the lineitem veto power). Some predicted that "[1]itigation would shroud the statutory
line-item veto in legal uncertainty for years and thus ensure that a President
would refrain from vigorously using this authority until the litigation was
resolved." J. Gregory Sidak, The Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1498, 1500 (1995). These predictions, however, did not prove true. While
the line-item veto remains under a constitutional "shroud," this condition has
certainly not curbed the President's use of his line-item veto powers. See infra
notes 172, 180-182 and accompanying text (discussing President Clinton's
continued uses of the Act's powers despite the lack of a judicial resolution).
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previous acceptance of "certainly impending" injuries, it is
irrational for the Court to deny jurisdiction here in the presence of
14
such imminent threats.'
The Raines Court recognized that the plaintiffs' arguments
required a two-tiered analysis including a determination of their
federal court standing and an examination of the merits of their
constitutional challenge.1 5 At the beginning of its standing
analysis, the Court made special mention that the leadership bodies
in both the House and the Senate, in their amici curiae brief, jointly
favored a reversal of the D.C. District Court on the merits of the
line-item veto's constitutionality.1 6 The Court relied heavily on
this congressional input in developing its opinion, but neglected to
properly consider its complete message in light of the two-tiered
analysis. Given the express language contained in the judicial
review clause of the Act," 7 the fact that a majority of both
Houses of Congress supported the standing of individual members
to challenge the constitutionality of the line-item veto cannot be
questioned.
The Raines Court improperly relied on congressional opposition
to the suit, which was based solely on the constitutional merits of
the Act, for its determination that the plaintiffs lacked standing.

I

"Votes on appropriations bills containing multiple items are 'certainly

impending' . . . since there is no doubt that the appellee Members [of Congress]
will be called upon to vote on appropriations bills in the next several months
[immediately following the official enactment of the Act]." Brief for Appellees
at *25, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), availablein 1997
WL 251423.
11 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317. The D.C. District Court also employed
this two-tiered approach, but found the claim to be ripe and therefore proceeded
directly to the merits of the Legislators' argument. See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 32.
116 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 n.2 ("The House Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group (comprising the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, and
the two Whips) and the Senate filed a joint amici curiae urging that the District
Court be reversed on the merits."). See Amici Curiae Brief of House Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group et al. at *1, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No.
96-1671), available in 1997 WL 251409.
117 See supra note 11 (providing language of the Act's judicial review
clause,
2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1), enabling any Member of Congress to bring a suit
challenging the Act's constitutionality).
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At the outset of their opinion, the Raines majority expressly recognized congressional silence on the standing question in the amici
curiae brief.'18 Yet at the conclusion of their opinion, the Court
stated that they "attach some importance to the fact that [plaintiffs]
have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of
Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose
their suit."'1 9 In addition, the defendants also conceded that "an
injury to official authority may support standing for a government
itself or its duly authorized agents."' 2 By confusing a lack of
support for the merits of a claim with a lack of support for
standing, the Court unfortunately took an illogical leap that clouded
the final results of their opinion. 2 '
.18See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 n.2 ("Their [amici curiae] brief states that
they express no position as to appellees' standing."). See Amici Curiae Brief of
House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group et al. at 2 n.2, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.
Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), availablein 1997 WL 251409. The only record
of Congress' opinion as to the Legislators' standing is contained in the plain
language of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. § 692 (a)(1), which is the
foundation upon which the Legislators base their claim. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at
2316. See also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 9-10 (4th ed. Supp. 1997)
(questioning the Court's statement that Congress did not support the filing of the
Byrd plaintiffs' suit given the Act's unambiguous judicial review clause).
19 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2322. The justices neglect to mention that Congress
only actively opposed the merits of the claim and they fail to state that both
Houses actually support a member of Congress' standing to challenge the Act in
federal court. See 2 U.S.C. § 692 (a)(1) (Supp. 1997).
120 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring). See also
Brief for
Appellants at *20-21, 25-28, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 961671), available in 1997 WL 251425.
121 While it is true that the Act was passed by a majority of both Houses
of
Congress and signed by the President, this only evinces that both branches
believe that the line-item veto advances sound policy. It does not suggest that
they each believed it to be constitutional. But see Oral Argument of Appellees
at *51, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), available in 1997
WL 276080 (providing assertion by the Court to the appellees that "[a] majority
of the colleagues of the plaintiffs have decided that this law is constitutional
. . ."). The Court assumes Congress' belief in the Act's constitutionality, despite
the fact that the Act's judicial review clause was inserted to expeditiously address
this very constitutional question which remains unanswered. See supra note 39
(reproducing statements by members of Congress explaining the purpose of the
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B. "Personal"and "Official Capacity" Injuries - Are They
Mutually Exclusive?
The specific questions of legislator standing presented by the
Byrd and Raines cases constituted issues of first impression for
both the D.C. District Court and the Supreme Court.'22 While the
District Court depended heavily upon its previous case law
concerning legislator standing, the Supreme Court chose to ignore
these lower court decisions. Instead, the Supreme Court relied on
but one remotely analogous case that did not involve federal
legislators.'23 In Coleman v. Miller,2 4 the Supreme Court
granted standing to Kansas legislators who "have a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their
votes.' ' 125 The Court accepted jurisdiction in Coleman, recognizing that the legislators had "adequate interest in the controversy by
reason of their [official public] duty to enforce the state statutes,"
despite a lack of private damage.126 The Raines majority distinguished Coleman because votes in the state legislature were

Act's judicial review clause).
122 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 (stating that "[w]e have never had
occasion to rule on the question of legislator standing presented here"); Byrd v.
Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 33 (1997) (stating that "[t]his case is indisputably one
of first impression"). Congress and the President remain divided over the
question of whether federal legislators can challenge laws in court. Jost, supra
note 74, at 2. See Kenneth Jost, Lawmakers Lose Standing With Courts, THE
RECORDER (Wash., D.C.), June 27, 1997, at 3 (stating that "[T]he high court
used the [Raines] case to issue its first direct ruling on the issue of legislative
standing").
123 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-21.
124 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Coleman, members of the Kansas legislature
were granted standing in their official capacity as legislators to challenge the use
of a tie-breaking vote by the President of their State Senate, resulting in the
state's allegedly improper ratification of a proposed Constitutional amendment
(the "Child Labor Amendment") by a vote of 21-20. Id. at 435. The Court
eventually ruled against the legislators on the merits of their complaint. Id. at
456.
12S Id. at 438.
126

Id. at 445.
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allegedly "denied effectiveness" in a specific instance, 27 rather
than in the ongoing and debilitating sense averred by the plaintiffs
in Raines. It is unclear how the Coleman holding can be so easily
dismissed when the Raines case presents a much stronger claim to
fundamental, constitutionally-reserved rights. 128 At the most
extreme, the Coleman Court incorrectly viewed Kansas as ratifying
a proposed constitutional amendment which had already been
rejected by twenty-six states and accepted by only five, 129 making
it highly improbable that the proposal would be enacted into
law.'30 However, members of Congress are subject to repeated
vote nullification as result of the Line Item Veto Act. Thus, the
"harms [in Raines] are more serious, more pervasive, and more
13
immediate than the harm at issue in Coleman.' '
It is apparent that the Constitution does not draw a definitive
line between the justiciability of claims raised by those suffering
"personal" harm and those suffering "official" harm. 13 2 With the

127
121

See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
See id. at 2328 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Flast v. Cohen, the Warren

Court demonstrated a preference for granting standing based upon the suitability
of the complaining plaintiffs, rather than on the justiciability of their claim. 392
U.S. 83, 99 (1968). Some scholars, however, continue to argue that standing
should be based upon the nature of the constitutional question being raised. See
Fletcher, supra note 48, at 290. The plaintiffs in Raines exhibited a substantial
injury claim that satisfies the Court's prudential and constitutional justiciability
limitations. "[T]he plaintiffs... do not ask the Court 'to pass upon' an 'abstract
intellectual proble[m],' but to determine 'a concrete living contest between'
genuine 'adversaries."' Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2327 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)). "[S]ince many of the plaintiffs will likely vote in the majority for
at least some appropriations bills that are then subject to presidential cancellation,
I think ... their votes are threatened with nullification too." Id. at 2329 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
'29See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
130 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2328 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"' Id. "'[The Line Item Veto Act] is a nullification of a senator or
representative's vote."' See Jost, supra note 74, at 2 (quoting Erwin
Chemerinsky, a Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Southern
California Law Center).
132 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2328 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that since the
Raines majority suggests that legislators might have standing to contest rules that
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exception of its recent Raines decision, the Supreme Court has
never denied standing to a legislator advancing a constitutional
claim for lack of a personal injury.133 The Raines majority
opinion follows from an underlying belief that legislators acting in
their official capacities can never suffer a "personal" injury
sufficient to confer Article III jurisdiction. 34 In Coleman, the

"'denied' them their vote . . . in a discriminatory manner," id. at 2320, it is
possible that "any constitutional rule distinguishing 'official' from 'personal'
injury is not absolute"). The strong views against this assertion are only
contained in concurring and dissenting opinions to D.C. Circuit cases. See Moore
v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d. 946, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that traditional constitutional "principle[s] [are] reduced
to meaninglessness, and the system of checks and balances replaced by a system
of judicial refereeship, if the officers of the political branches are deemed to have
a personal, 'private' interest in the powers that have been conferred upon them
• . ."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d. 21, 42
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (stating that individual members of
Congress seeking judicial review over the validity of the presidential "pocket
veto" did not sue because of "any personal injury done to them but solely to
have the courts define and protect their governmental powers"), vacatedas moot
sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
"' See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318. However, the Supreme Court points out
in Raines that federal jurisdiction may be conferred where a member of Congress
asserts an individual injury. Id. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476
(1987) (granting standing to state representative alleging damage to his
professional reputation); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)
(allowing Congressman Adam Clayton Powell to challenge his exclusion from
the House of Representatives and his subsequent loss of salary).
134 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme
Court, former D.C. Circuit Court Judge and Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia
advanced this narrow interpretation of Article III standing doctrine. See generally
Scalia, supra note 62, at 882-84. Scalia has asserted that strict standing
requirements encourage separation of powers by excluding several issues from
judicial review. Scalia, supranote 62, at 892-97. He asserted that statutory grants
of standing based upon generalized rights are unconstitutional. See Scalia, supra
note 62, at 894-97. These ideas restrict the will of Congress and the President to
create standing. See Nichol, supra note 30, at 1940 n. 143. At one time, Scalia
intimated that the prohibition against legislator standing might not be absolute,
but this would seem to be in an extreme case. Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that "unless those powers have been denied in such
fashion as to produce a governmental result that harms some entity or individual
who brings the matter before us, we have no constitutional power to interfere").
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Supreme Court recognized that the state legislators lacked a
"personal" injury, yet jurisdiction over their complaint was
conferred.'35 In Raines, however, the Court viewed as deficient
the "official" quality of the members' injury, which "runs ... with
the Member's seat, a seat which the Member holds ... as trustee
'
for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power. 136
While the Supreme Court distinguished Coleman on the grounds
that the state legislators' votes were in jeopardy of complete
nullification,' 37 the Raines Legislators complained of a similar
situation. Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, stated: "since
many of the present plaintiffs will likely vote in the majority for at
least some appropriations bills that are the subject of presidential
cancellation, I think that-on their view of the law-their votes are
threatened with nullification too.' 38 The Raines Court advanced
its position that the members of Congress sued only in their official
capacities by stating that if a plaintiff retired from the legislature,
their claim would be lost and instead be possessed by their
successor. 139 This argument fails to distinguish Coleman, leaving
each as a case of "official" injury with opposing results on the
standing question.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the Raines opinion, Justice Scalia's
influences are evident.
' See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,445-46 (1939). In Coleman, Justice
Frankfurter stated: "In no sense are they matters of 'private damage.' They
pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing
the legislative process." Id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 (referencing THE FEDERALIST No. 62 at
378
(James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). See also The Harvard Law Review
Association 1997, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 217, 222 n.47 (1997) (stating that prior to Raines, the Court did not use
the personal injury requirement to differentiate personal and official capacity
injuries).
...Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319.
.3 Id. at 2329 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 2318. The plaintiff in Raines, Senator Mark 0. Hatfield, actually
did retire from the Senate prior to the Court's decision. Id. at 2315 n.l. The
Court asserted that a retiring plaintiff legislator would relinquish this sort of
claim to their successor, but curiously failed to apply this logic to retired plaintiff
Hatfield. Id. Thus, the Court damages its argument that a member of Congress
cannot suffer a personal injury.
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By holding that the Raines plaintiffs lacked a "judicially
cognizable injury" pursuant to the Act's existence, the Court
suggested that such a requisite injury could not be effected until
after the President exercised his powers conferred by the Act."4
Instead of considering the reasons for the establishment of the
"personal" injury standard and testing them against the Legislators'
claim of power dilution, the Raines Court found the averred injury
to be "wholly abstract and widely dispersed," and therefore
unworthy of federal court jurisdiction.'41
Several of the Supreme Court's denials of jurisdiction to
complaints lacking "personal" injuries involve "tax paying"
plaintiffs challenging government actions.'42 Standing is usually
140

The Court states, "We also note that our conclusion neither deprives

Members of Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or
exempt appropriations bills from its reach), nor forecloses the Act from
constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as
a result of the Act)." See id. at 2322. But see Oral Argument of Appellees at *56, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), availablein 1997 WL
276080 (suggesting that exempting appropriations bills from the Act's reach
would be extremely arduous). During the oral argument, the Court asked:
[S]uppose Congress decides later on that maybe some type of
appropriations shouldn't be subject to this [a hypothetical bill
containing items A, B, and C] line item veto, so they include [a]
passage in a subsequent bill saying that the Line Item Veto Act won't
apply to a certain type of appropriation. That, of course, has to go to
the President for signature, and he then can veto that and that then
would require enough votes to override that veto.
Id. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, representing the defendants, replied:
"Yes." Id.
141 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2322.
142 The Court has steadily denied taxpayer standing to challenge federal
expenditures. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-90 (1982) (denying
taxpayers' standing in challenge to the constitutionality of a grant of federal land
to a religious college pursuant to the establishment clause); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227-28 (1974) (holding that
taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the membership of members of Congress
in the military reserve, which they asserted violated art. I, § 6, cl. 2 of the
Constitution, restricting members of Congress from holding "any office under the
United States"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170-71 (1974)
(denying taxpayer standing to challenge the statute appropriating funds for the
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refused because of "Joe citizen's" inability to manifest injuries
distinct from those suffered by the general public. 43 It would
seem then that the primary purpose for the personal injury standard
is to prevent the federal courts from adjudicating harms that do not
belong to the plaintiff. Yet, it is unclear why a legislator, or small
group of legislators, acting in their official capacities are characterized as "Joe citizen," rather than as distinctive challengers of
government action.'" The existence of the line-item veto may not
injure members of Congress "personally," however, its mere
presence and aura profoundly affects
their official duties and
14
powers concretely and particularly.

Central Intelligence Agency because it allegedly violated art. I, § 9, cl. 7 of the
Constitution which requires "a regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money").
14' Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) ("[R]ecognition
of standing
in such circumstances would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a
vehicle for the vindication of the value interest of concerned bystanders."')
(quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). "Were we to
recognize standing premised on an 'injury' consisting solely of an alleged
violation of a personal constitutional right ...a principled consistency would
dictate recognition of respondents' standing to challenge the execution of every
capital sentence on the basis of a personal right ..
" Allen, 468 U.S. at 756
n.21 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489-90).
144 It has been argued that "increasinglypervasive government
bureaucracies
develop interests that elude or resist democratic control and distort the legislative
process." Susan Bandes, The Idea of A Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 303 (1990)
(citing Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The NonHoffeldian or IdeologicalPlaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1040, 1044 (1968)
(arguing that the personal stake requirement is unrelated to the Court's duty to
do justice); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Forward: The
Forms of Justice,93 HARV. L. REV.1, 8 (1979)). This type of development calls
into question the wisdom of judicial avoidance where concrete constitutional
issues like the line-item veto are expressly designated for Supreme Court review.
See Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2324 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "as a factual
matter [the members of Congress] have a more direct and tangible interest in the
preservation of that power than the general citizenry has"); Hendrick v. Walters,
865 P.2d 1232, 1236-38 (Okla. 1993) (holding that a legislator had personal
interest in suit to determine whether Governor lawfully assumed office after
substantial interaction between the Governor and the legislature).
"" The Raines majority stresses that to achieve standing, the plaintiff must,
among other requirements, suffer "a legally protected interest which is ...
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The Raines injury is not "impersonal" in the same sense as
taxpayers' widely held grievances. 14 6 The harms averred in
Raines belong distinctly, concretely and particularly to the
Legislators. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia and their colleagues in
the Raines majority should have acknowledged this distinction.
Instead, the claims were grouped with Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife"47
' and various other failed impersonal and generalized
injuries, ignoring their profound
effect on the operating structure of
48
government.
legislative

concrete and particularized." Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). "'[The existence of the lineitem veto] gives [the President] a lot more power to control individual
lawmakers. If [the President is] smart, he can use [the Act] to extract concessions
along the way in (appropriations bills)."' Eilperin & Vande Hei, supra note 108,
at *2 (quoting unnamed "GOP leadership aide").
146 In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Supreme
Court
dismissed a taxpayer suit challenging the appropriateness of certain federal
expenditures for lack of Article III jurisdiction by stating that:
The party who invokes the power [of federal court jurisdiction] must
be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury
as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally.
Id. at 488. The Supreme Court has upheld this principal in several subsequent
opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974)
(holding that taxpaying plaintiff who had generalized grievance that federal
government failed to disclose Central Intelligence Agency expenditures pursuant
to the Constitution, art. I, § 9, cl. 7, lacked standing because the impact on him
was "common to all members of the public"); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633
(1937) (dismissing suit regarding Justice Black's appointment to the Supreme
Court, because private complaining interest was "common to all members of the
public").
14'504 U.S. 555 (1992); supra notes 22, 142 and accompanying text
(referencing some of the Supreme Court's decisions denying standing to parties
failing to raise sufficient injuries).
14' A violation or infringement of the democratic process might trigger
a
special need for judicial intervention. Simard, supra note 95, at 326 n. 133. See
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[A]ppellants here claim deprivation of a particular opportunity to vote in a
manner prescribed by the Constitution. Both the alleged injury and the legal
interest are specific and concrete."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
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C. Drawing the Wrong Analogies
To reach its conclusion, the Raines Court employed questionable reasoning in various stages of its opinion. A primary example
is where the Court devoted nearly two pages of its opinion to
analogizing the Raines scenario with President Andrew Johnson's
near impeachment as a result of violating the Tenure of Office
Act.'49 The Court posited that if they granted standing to the
Legislators, President Johnson would also have been deserving of
jurisdiction to challenge the "diminution of his official [Presidential] power" caused by the existence of the Tenure of Office
Act. 5 ° President Johnson's claims are summarily characterized as
being non-justiciable even though the matter never came before a
court.1 5 The Court was compelled to rely on such speculation to

advance their holding in Raines because of their lack of jurisprudence on legislator standing and their unwillingness to adopt the
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit.' 52
"4 Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2321-22. The Tenure of Office Act of 1867
provided that a President could not remove a Cabinet Member that required
confirmation of the Senate without consent of the Senate. ch. 154, Stat. 30
(repealed 1887).
11o Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2321.
' Justice Stevens stated:

[T]he fact that others did not choose to bring suit does not necessarily
mean the Constitution would have precluded them from doing so...
[and furthermore] because Congress did not authorize declaratory
judgment actions until the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 955, the fact that President Johnson did not bring such an
action in 1868 is not entirely surprising.
Id. at 2326 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See id. at 2329 (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(stating that "[I] do not believe that the majority's historical examples primarily
involving the Executive Branch and involving lawsuits that were not brought...
are legally determinative"); Jonathan L. Entin, PanelI. War Powers and Foreign
Affairs: The Dog That Rarely Barks, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1305, 1309
(1997) (stating that "the Court's conclusion that the absence of [past similar
interbranch] litigation implies recognition that interbranch differences do not
implicate legally cognizable harms does not follow").
'52See supra note 70 (outlining the D.C. Circuit's principal legislator
standing cases).
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In formulating its opinion, the Raines majority managed to
sidestep several applicable Supreme Court decisions. For example,
in Gladstone v Village of Bellwood,'53 the Supreme Court held
that residents of Bellwood, Illinois were acceptable litigants in a
suit alleging that a realty company engaged in "steering" prospective home buyers to areas based upon their race. 54 Although the
plaintiff residents never intended to purchase a home, the Court
granted their standing claim because the realty company's actions
caused a diminution in the value of the residents' homes.' The
residents also successfully argued that the company's practices
generally "deprived [them] of the social and professional benefits
of living in an integrated society."' 6 Furthermore, the residents
sued as the "Village of Bellwood," which is a municipal corporation.'57 The Court did not address the question of whether the
"Village of Bellwood" could be viewed as a "private person"
entitled to sue, stating that the petitioners did not properly raise the
issue in their brief. 5 By ignoring the residents' "public" status,
the Court avoided addressing whether the village actually supported
the merits of the suit.'59 If residents who did not intend to pur-

441 U.S. 91 (1979).
Id. at 115.
.55Id. (stating that "the economic value of one's own home has declined as
'

114

a result of the conduct of another certainly is sufficient under Article III to allow
standing to contest the legality of that conduct"). See Northeast Fla. Chapter of
Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 664
(1993) (allowing contractors to challenge the City's allegedly discriminatory
bidding policy without showing that they would receive contracts in the absence
of the policy).
16 Gladstone, 442 U.S. at
95.
...Id. at 109.
15. Id. The Court reasoned that standing is "'as [broad] as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution."' Id. (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 n.21 (1972)).
159 See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
level of support for the Raines plaintiffs' claims). While the Raines Court
stressed that the members of Congress did not expressly represent the opinions
of the congressional body, the Gladstone Court did not address whether the
Bellwood community ever voted or exhibited support for the challenge to the
realty company's practices, even though each resident's property was allegedly
devalued. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115.
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chase a home were granted standing to sue based upon allegations
of declining property values, why should members of Congress,
who fully intended to vote on appropriations legislation, be banned
from the same court where they allege a substantial diminution of
their constitutionally granted powers to vote and legislate? 16°
Thus, the Court construed the injury raised by the plaintiffs in
Raines as insubstantial, while the Bellwood residents
were offered
16
enormous leeway to advance their standing claim.'
In its Lujan opinion, 162 the Court attempted to address expanding categories of acceptable Article III injuries, but their inquiry
failed to result in the implementation of definitive limitations.
"'[B]roadening [statutory] categories of injury that may be alleged
in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have
suffered an injury.""16 3 This statement, delivered by Justice Scalia

60

While Congress may delegate some of its rulemaking functions to the

other branches of government, the delegation must be appropriate. Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989). The legislature may not delegate its
basic lawmaking authority. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737,
1744 (1996) ("[T]he lawmaking function belongs to Congress... and may not
be conveyed to another branch or entity."). The plaintiffs in Raines complained
of an injury to their "lawmaking functions" pursuant to the existence of the Act,
but were denied standing despite averring a more defined claim than those
advanced in Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 112, Trafficante, 441 U.S. at 208, or City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 664. See also Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
407 (1928). In Hampton, the Court stated:
"The true distinction therefore, is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
Id. (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Commissioners of
Clinton, I Ohio St. 77, 88-89 (1852)).
16' Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 112 ("Although an injury to one's 'society'
arguably would be an exceptionally generalized harm or, more important for
Art[icle] III purposes, one that could not conceivably be the result of these
petitioners conduct, we are obliged to construe the complaint favorably to
respondents [Bellwood residents] . . .
162

504 U.S. 555 (1992).

'63Id. at 578 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)).
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on behalf of the Lujan majority, seems to suggest a willingness by
the Court to broadly construe the characteristics of a permissible
Article III injury. However, in cases such as Gladstone"6 and
Trafficante,"6 ' the Court employed this expressed philosophy in
reverse: they first accept the injury claims of otherwise common
taxpayers because they aver racially charged concerns, and then
"broaden" the categories of Article III injury to meet these
parameters. This comparison suggests that the Court does not
follow a purely formalistic approach in its justiciability determinations. 166 Rather, there are definite indications of natural law
influences 167 in both Gladstone Realtors and Trafficante. So why
6
is it that the Raines plaintiffs are not granted such deference? 1

"6441 U.S. at 112 (allowing village residents who did not intend to
purchase a home to challenge the professional practices of a realty company that
allegedly steered potential new home-buyers to areas based upon race).
165 409 U.S. at 208 (granting tenants of housing complex standing to
challenge the allegedly racially discriminatory new tenant selection practices of
their landlord).
166 See Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrineand Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REv.
93, 136 (1996) (outlining the characteristics of some of the Court's formalist
opinions). Kelso and Kelso explain that in the Supreme Court's original formalist
era, 1872-1937, standing was strictly characterized within the traditional and
customary meaning of "cases and controversies." Id. at 110. The most significant
standing case during this era was Frothinghamv. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
"It is of much significance that no precedent sustaining the right to maintain suits
like this has been called to our attention . .. ." Id. at 487-88. The modem
formalist approach began in 1974 with the Burger Court and is now most
strongly advanced by Justice Scalia. See Kelso & Kelso, supra, at 122-23. In
Lujan, Justice Scalia concluded that the plaintiffs did not show an adequately
imminent or actual injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2
(1992). "This conclusion is consistent with the formalist preference for a clearly
proven, classic kind of injury as a matter satisfying injury-in-fact analysis." Kelso
& Kelso, supra, at 123.
167 Modem natural law standing decisions are characterizedby a recognition
of Article III's injury requirements and an appreciation for federal court standing
where an alleged injury is not entirely direct or apparent. See Kelso & Kelso,
supra note 166, at 128.
168 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 163, 166 (arguing that the injury in fact
requirement lacks historical support). Sunstein supplies an extensive LEXIS study
to back-up this claim: In the long history of the Supreme Court, standing has
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The strong opinions of Justice Scalia, first expressed in his Suffolk
University Law Review article, 169 and later advanced in his D.C.
Circuit concurrence in Moore v U.S. House of Representatives,70
now appear to have silenced the discretionary tone set forth in
some of the Supreme Court's earlier standing decisions. 7 '
V THE FUTURE OF THE LINE-ITEM VETO IN THE COURTS
AFTER RAINES

The Supreme Court's failure to address the merits of the lineitem veto's constitutional controversy has fostered a sea of
confusion in both Washington D.C. and across the nation.'72 It is

been discussed in terms of Article III on 117 occasions [through November,
1992]. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 169. Of those 117, 55, or almost half took
place after 1985. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 169. Of the 117, 71 of the
discussions took place after 1980, and of the 117, 109 occurred since 1965.
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 169. He argues for the use of a more flexible test
where a state law, federal law or the Constitution can confer a "cause of action"
on a plaintiff. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 166.
169 Scalia, supra note 62, at 881.
170 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

171 See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion,60 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 543 (1985) (concluding that it is necessary for the Court to exercise
discretion in jurisdictional matters to avoid undue conflicts with the other
branches of the federal government). The Court's decision on standing in Raines
is affecting the strategies of other potential litigants. The Southeastern Legal
Foundation was forced to reevaluate its legal strategy for challenging statistical
sampling methods in the 2000 Census. See Juliet Eilperin, Unlikely Fallout
Begins From Line-Item Ruling, High Court's Recent Decision on Veto Affects
Members of Congress' Standing to Sue in Other Cases, ROLL CALL (Wash.,
D.C.), July 21, 1997 at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
The group planned to enlist Representative Bob Carr in their suit but decided to
rethink their plan after the Raines decision. Id. The ruling is also likely to
strengthen a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding a House rule
requiring "a three-fifths super-majority" for tax increases. Id. As in Raines,these
members of Congress averred vote dilution as their basis for federal court
standing. Id.
172 See Gugliotta & Pianin, supra note 77, at Al ("[The President's use of
the line item veto has] 'touched off an uproar among congressional leaders ....
We're dealing with a raw abuse of political power by a president who doesn't
have to run again.. ..

"'

(quoting Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman,
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apparent that the Raines Court anticipated the initiation of other
suits challenging the line-item veto's constitutionality after the
President exercised his newly granted authority. 7 3 This assertion
was aggressively advanced in Justice Souter's concurring opinion,' 74 where he stated: "[T]he certainty of a plaintiff who obviously would have standing to bring a suit to court after the politics
had at least subsided from a full boil is a good reason to resolve
doubts about standing against the plaintiff invoking an official
interest.''175 However, Justice Souter made the questionable
assumption that the tense political atmosphere existing at the time
of the Act's passage would subside when the President invoked his
first veto. This reasoning has proven false. 176 By neglecting to
address the merits of the line-item veto controversy, the Supreme
Court fostered an environment where the tenseness has now "boiled
177
over."'
Using his line-item veto power, President Clinton has "canceled" eighty-two items from appropriations bills since August 11,

Ted Stevens (R-Alaska))); The Harvard Law Review Association 1997, supra
note 136, at 218 ("[T]he law of legislative standing after Raines is a doctrine
fraught with analytical inconsistency and uncertain boundaries.").
173 See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2322 (1997). See also Jost, supra
note 122, at 3 (stating that the defendants' lawyer in Raines, Acting Solicitor
General Walter Dellinger, said that "a [new] suit could be maintained by
someone who stood to benefit from a program ...[cancelled] by the president");
infra note 164 (referencing constitutional challenges to the Line Item Veto Act
of 1997 brought after Raines).
174
Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2324-25 (Souter, J., concurring).
175Id. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring).
176 But see Neal Devins & Michael Fitts, Editorial, Don't Rush the Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at A15 (arguing subsequent to the D.C. District
Court's City of New York v. Clinton decision, 958 F. Supp. 168 (1998), the
Supreme Court should refrain from addressing the constitutionality of the lineitem veto until the Court is able "to sort out the impact of the new law," and
gain "a firm understanding of how the statute works before passing judgment").
177 "It is becoming increasingly clear that this so-called 'tool' [the line-item
veto] is really not for the purpose of cutting spending, but is rather a blunt
instrument intended primarily to intimidate members of Congress, so that the
White House can have its way." See Press Release, Sen. Byrd Statement on
NTEU Line Item Veto Act Court Decision, Jan. 7, 1998, (on file with Journalof
Law and Policy).
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1997, which will reportedly trim $1.9 billion from the federal
deficit over the next five years. 178 However, these savings are all
based upon the dubious assumption that the Act will ultimately be
found constitutional by the Supreme Court. If the Act is overturned,
there will be at least eighty-two constituencies seeking to recover
79
damages. 1
After much speculation as to which of these constituencies
would overcome fears of Executive retribution and challenge the
Act, 0 three new suits challenging the constitutionality of the lineitem veto were filed in response to the President's first uses of his
newly found authority.'8 ' At the same time, efforts got underway

178

See Line-Item Veto Scorecard: $1.9 Billion over 5 Years, WASH.

POST,

Dec. 4, 1997, at A2 1. While this may appear to be enormous savings, the federal
government will spend $9 trillion over the same five year span. Id.
179 Id.
"' The three groups affected by President Clinton's vetoes [of August
11, 1997] - farmers, insurance and financial companies, and the State
of New York - all have broad agendas before the federal government,
and don't take lightly the risk of antagonizing the President and
becoming a constitutional guinea pig .... [For an initial period] the
three groups have concentrated their efforts on legislative, rather than
judicial, fixes.
T. R. Goldman, Waiting For a Line-Item Veto Suit, THE RECORDER (Wash.,
D.C.), Sept. 23, 1997, at 1.
181 The first suit was filed by the National Treasury Employees Union
("NTEU"). See Naftali Bendavid, Line-Item Veto Foes PreparingFor Battle;
Courts Likely to Get Last Word - And Soon, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1997, at 1.
This group also filed the first line-item veto suit before the Act's enactment only
to be denied standing. See supra note 8 (referencing National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). In this second suit,
they were assured to appear before a different D.C. District Court judge as Judge
Charles Richey, who presided over their first suit, passed away. Goldman, supra
note 180, at 1. The NTEU also successfully challenged the constitutionality of the
1986 Gramm-Rudman Budget Balancing Act. Juliet Eilperin, As Line-Item Goes to
Court, Members Revisit Veto Law, Roll Call (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 20, 1997, at *1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File. Their suit alleged injury as a
result of being victimized by the cancellation of funding that would allow federal
employees to change their pension plans. Stephen Barr, Judge Clears Wayfor Pension
'Open Season,' WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1998, at A17.
On Jan. 6, 1998, United States District Judge Thomas Hogan approved a
negotiated settlement between the President Clinton's Administration and the NTEU,
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which included a full recision of this particular veto. Id. Under this settlement, Judge
Hogan agreed that the President "overstepped his authority... when he used his new
line-item veto power" in this instance. Ruth Larson, Judge Rules Clinton Abused Veto
Power; Rejects Line-Itemn Use on Pension Plans,WASH. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at Al.
As in each of the suits challenging the Act's constitutionality, the NTEU asserted that
the line-item veto embodied an unconstitutional shift of legislative power to the
Executive branch. Id. Judge Hogan dismissed this charge as moot given the
settlement. Id.
The second suit was filed on October 16, 1997, by New York City Mayor
Rudolph W. Giuliani and several municipal organizations, including the National
Health and Human Services Employees Union, District Council 37, and the Greater
New York Hospital Association. City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 171
(D.D.C.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1123 (1998). They too challenged the Act's
constitutionality and claimed injury as a result of President Clinton's use of the lineitem veto authority on August 11, 1997 to "cancel" from the balanced budget
agreement an item that allowed New York to operate under a special formula to
qualify for higher Medicaid payments from the federal government. Line-Item Veto
to Face New Court Challenge, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, Oct. 16, 1997, at *1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File; Eric Pianin & Stephen Barr, US.
Workers' Shift In Pensions Vetoed; Union, New York City File Court Challenges,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1997, at Al. While New York Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan did not join as a party to the suit, he did file an amicus curiae brief
supporting the City's claims along with his fellow Raines plaintiffs Senator Byrd and
Representative Levin. See City of New York, 985 F. Supp. at 169 n.1. This suit
claimed that if the veto was allowed to stand, New York State would lose $2.6 billion
in vital Medicaid reimbursements. Id. at 172. On February 12, 1998, D.C. District
Court Judge Thomas Hogan held that: 1) the City plaintiffs had standing to sue by
virtue of the President's use of the line-item veto power to their direct detriment, id.
at 175; and 2) the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 is unconstitutional. See id. at 169
(stating that "the Line Item Veto Act violates the procedural requirements ordained
in Article I of the United States Constitution and impermissibly upsets the balance of
powers so carefully prescribed by its Framers"). However, this ruling does not prevent
the President from continuing to use the line-item power. See Pear, supra note 6, at
A23 (quoting White House spokesman Barry Toiv who stated that President Clinton
"remains ready to use it under appropriate circumstances").
The third suit was filed by the Snake River Potato Growers cooperative of
Blackfoot, Idaho, on October 21, 1997. Jim Vande Hei & Juliet Eilperin, Morning
Business, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 27, 1997, at * 1, availablein LEXIS, Nexis

Library, ALLNWS File. The cooperative asserted an injury as a result of the
President's August 11, 1997 cancellation of a tax provision allowing companies to
defer capital-gains taxes when selling processing plants to farm cooperatives. Id.
Absent the veto, farming cooperatives would continue to buy processing plants for
less total cost. Id. This.matter became combined with the City of New York case by
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in both Houses of Congress to repeal the Act.'8 2 In addition,
using the powers granted under the Act, 183 Congress overruled a
Presidential cancellation of funding for military construction projects.'84 Now that it appears the Supreme Court will finally move
beyond justiciability considerations to address the merits of
constitutional challenges to the Act, it is extremely likely that the
Court will follow its formalist tendencies"8 5 and hold that the Act
encroaches upon the Constitution's Presentment Clause.186 While
the D.C. District Court, City of New York, 985 F. Supp. at 172, and is now being
jointly appealed before the Supreme Court by the Clinton Administration. See Pear,
supra note 6, at Al.
182 Senators Byrd and Moynihan introduced a bill in the Senate to repeal the
Act on October 24, 1997. See S1319, 105th Cong. (1997). See Stephen Singer,
Byrd Wants Law Repealed, Line Item Veto Again Targeted by Senators,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 25, 1997, at 1A ("In offering this legislation,
I'm attempting to restore the kind of government with checks and balances the
people have enjoyed for over 200 years." (quoting Senator Byrd)). In the House,
Representative David Skaggs introduced a similar bill on October 9, 1997. See
H.R. 2649 105th, Cong. (1997). However, both bills face uphill battles See
Senators Mount Effort to Repeal Line-Item Veto, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997,
at A3. While President Clinton continues to face a great deal of criticism
regarding his use of the line-item veto, ironically a great deal of the clamoring
comes from supporters of the veto power who disapprove of the way the
President has chosen to apply the power. See Senator John McCain, Line-Item
Furor, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1997, at A25 ("The administration's process for
determining which items to veto seems arbitrary at best. It has no established,
consistent and objective criteria against which all programs are evaluated, nor are
these criteria clearly stated in advance of the action."); Press Release of Senator
John McCain, Letter to President Clinton on Use of Line-Item Veto, Nov. 1,
1997, (on file with Journal of Law and Policy).
183 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 691b(a), 691d (Supp. 1997). The Act contains procedures
for both Houses of Congress to consider "disapproval bills," in response to
individual line-item vetoes, which may be enacted into law through the normal
procedures in art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. Id. If such a bill passes, it
nullifies the President's cancellation. 2 U.S.C. § 691b(a).
184 See Press Release of Rep. Jim Hanson, House & Senate Vote To Override
PresidentialLine-Item Veto, Nov. 8, 1997 (on file with Journal of Law and
Policy).
185 See supra note 168 (outlining the Supreme Court's recent formalist
leanings).
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
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87
there are strong policy reasons for establishing a line-item veto,,
the Constitution should not be stretched so far from its moorings
both out of respect for the separation of powers"'8 and deference
to the plain language of the Presentment Clause.

233 (1997). Professor Gerhardt argues that:
the Act violates Article I by allowing the President to sign or veto a
measure in a form never actually approved by both houses of
Congress; involves an illegitimate attempt by the Congress to redefine
statutorily the constitutional term Bill; contravenesboth Supreme Court
authority severely restricting congressional discretion to delegate a core
legislative function and long-standing congressional understanding of
the prerequisites for a legitimate bill; and radically alters the fundamental balance of power between Congress and the President on
budgetary matters.
Id. at 233. These comments were included in a comprehensive statement
delivered by Senator Moynihan on the Senate floor during the final debate on the
line-item veto. 141 CONG. REC. S4409, 4444-46 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995).
'87 See supra note 6 (describing the government's efforts to curb its use of
"pork").
188 Gerhardt, supra note 186, at 238 ("The framers deliberately chose to
place the power of the purse outside of the Executive because they feared the
consequences of centralizing the powers of the purse and the sword."). See also
THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 300 (James Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1987) ("This
power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people."). It is likely that the only way the line-item veto will clear the Supreme
Court's review is through an amendment to the Constitution. See Gerhardt, supra
note 186, at 246 (concluding that while a line-item veto constitutional amendment might be the most sound option for creating this new form of executive
power, this idea has yet to gather needed congressional or popular support). This
method was suggested in previous debates by Congress. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 6,
104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 4, 103rd Cong. (1993). It is interesting that so
many mention that President Reagan began the modem movement toward
adopting line-item veto powers for the Executive, see supra note 7, yet he did
not ask Congress to unilaterally cede its legislative powers. See Ronald Reagan,
Message to the Congress Transmittingthe Fiscal Year 1985 Budget, reprintedin

1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD
REAGAN: 1984, at 130, 133 (1984) ("We need a constitutional amendment

granting the President power to veto individual items in appropriations bills.")
(emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION

In Raines, members of Congress asserted injury to their
legislative authority to make appropriations decisions as a result of
the Act's enactment. This is an entirely different injury than those
advanced in the new round of suits, which follow from alleged
harm caused by specific uses of the line-item veto. While there is
a general consensus that the Supreme Court will now get beyond
standing to finally address the constitutionality of the line-item veto
in these cases, the injuries averred by the Raines plaintiffs, which
were denied credibility by the Court, should not be dismissed or
overlooked. The fundamental issue remains: whether a member of
Congress can ever suffer a judicially cognizable injury sufficient to
warrant federal court jurisdiction."8 9 Despite Justice Scalia's view,
a legislator should be able to raise a judicial challenge to a law
such as the Line Item Veto Act, where Congress grants a fundamental congressional function to another branch of government.
While the diminution of a legislator's political power is not an
injury in the classic sense, it is an injury nonetheless which is
deserving of Article III jurisdiction.

' See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1976) (demonstrating that in
the past, the Supreme Court has granted standing to a member of Congress to

challenge the constitutionality of a law without questioning the quality of the
legislator's injury).

